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Abstract 
Land pawning contracts in which the pawner temporarily transfers his land cultivation 
rights to the pawnee in return for a loan with an agreement to redeem it on loan repayment 
have increased in importance in Philippine rice growing villages. This paper uses cross 
sectional data from farm households in five heterogenous production environments to 
analyze the determinants of the choice of pawning contracts. The analysis shows that land 
pawning is an informal credit instrument used by small farmers to obtain large loans to 
finance productive investments, such as non-farm employment, where the returns to 
investment are high. An econometric model was developed to examine the factors affecting 
the choice of pawning contracts and the observed loan size. The results suggest that farm 
households with poorer quality land, smaller farm sizes and lower physical and human assets 
pawn out land, while wealthier farm households with larger farm sizes and greater physical 
and human assets pawn in. The observed loan size is explained by reputation of pawners 
and rice cropping intensity in the region. 
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INFORMAL FINANCE THROUGH LAND PAWNING CONTRACTS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE PHILIPPINES 
by 
Geetha Nagarajan, Cristina C. David, and Richard L. Meyer1 
Informal finance has become the main source of rural credit in the last two decades 
in the Philippines (Adams and Sandoval; Bautista and Magno). High risk and lending 
transaction costs, and the lack of collateral of small farmers, coupled with regulated interest 
rates, led to credit rationing by formal financial institutions. A number of mechanisms 
involving collateral substitutes have been developed in the informal financial markets mainly 
through the interlinkage of credit with labor, land, and product markets to lower transaction 
costs and risks. The nature of the mechanisms that emerge depends primarily on the 
technological and institutional features of the rural sector (Binswanger and Rosenzweig). 
Land pawning contracts represent one type of collateral substitute used in informal 
markets to obtain large loans for purposes and for borrowers for which formal loans are 
difficult or impossible to obtain. Although pawning contracts are widely used in Asia, the 
pawning of land cultivation rights is a recent phenomena in the Philippines (Adams and 
Sandoval; Esguerra and Meyer; Onchon; Wijaya and Sturgess). The recent pawning 
contracts are a modification of sangland bili contracts under the pacto de retroventa (sale 
1 Geetha Nagarajan is a Graduate Research Associate, Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, USA. Cristina C. David is an 
Economist, International Rice Research Institute, Philippines; Richard L. Meyer is a 




with an option to repurchase) arrangement used by the Chinese settlers in the early 
eighteenth century to acquire 'fee tail' land (land transferable to only legitimate heirs) 
through money lending 1• Nagarajan, Quisumbing and Otsuka argued that land pawning 
contracts recently emerged because of increased credit demand in rice growing areas where 
land reform restricted land transfers, where technological innovations in rice farming 
conferred a transaction value to cultivation rights, and where credit markets were not well 
developed 2• 
In a pawning transaction, the pawner temporarily transfers his cultivation rights to 
the pawnee in return for a loan, and can redeem these rights upon loan repayment. During 
the contract period, the returns from the land accruing to the pawnee, who assumes all 
operating expenses including any land rental payment, represent implicit interest earned 
(paid) by the pawnee (pawner). A permanent transfer of cultivation rights may occur if a 
large loan is not repaid after a long period of time. 
This paper examines the determinants of choice of pawning contract by farmers in 
rice growing areas. The study is based on a cross-section analysis of farm households in five 
villages representing a heterogenous production environment for growing rice. The next 
section describes the study villages and characteristics of pawning contracts. After discussing 
the conceptual model in the third section, section IV presents the results of the econometric 
model used to explain the determinants of pawning contracts. The final section discusses 
policy implications. 
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Description of the Study Villages and Pawning Contracts 
The data used in this study were obtained from a survey conducted by the Interna-
tional Rice Research Institute for its study of the "Differential Impact of Modern Rice 
Technology Across Production Environments". The survey collected data from 286 randomly 
selected farm households in five selected villages located in the two major rice growing 
regions of the Philippines during the period 198S-86 and 1989. The transactions analyzed 
included all pawning transactions for the 198S-89 period reported by the households based 
on recall in 1989 3• 
Table 1 presents the socioeconomic characteristics of the sample households. Region 
1 is more progressive in rice cultivation and more urbanized than Region 2 which is 
characterized by more rugged terrain and is located farther from the metropolitan center. 
The villages, Vl and V2 located in Region 1 and V3, V 4 and VS in Region 2, represent 
different production environments. While Vl and V3 are fully irrigated by gravity irrigation 
systems and grow two ric~ crops a year, V2 and V 4 are characterized by favorable rainfed 
conditions with a few farms practicing double cropping. VS, a drought prone rainfed village, 
has the most unfavorable environment for rice growing. Modern rice varieties (MV) are 
fully adopted in Vl, V2, and V3, whereas traditional varieties are still planted in the hilly 
part of V 4 and the mountainous part of VS during the wet season. Reflecting the differenc-
es in production environments and adoption of modern varieties, the average rice yield per 
hectare is significantly higher in the irrigated than in the rainfed villages, particularly in VS. 
While land reform was well implemented in Region 1, it was not in Region 2. Under 
the 1972 land reform of rice and corn lands, share tenants were supposed to be converted 
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either to leaseholders by Operation Leasehold when the landlord owned less than 7 hectares 
of land, or to Certificate of Land Transfer ( CLT) holders under Operation Land Transfer 
when the landlord owned more than 7 hectares of land (Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano). 
Before the implementation of land reform, Region 1 villages consisted of large rice hacien-
das covering more than 100 hectares and the majority of farmers were share tenants, so they 
were subject to Operation Land Transfer. Region 2 villages were characterized by small 
landlord operators also employing share tenants. But due to weak implementation of 
Operation Leasehold, the.tenants received permanent leasehold rights and the landowners 
retained ownership. Otsuka demonstrated that increased residual gains due to modern 
technology raised the economic interests of the share tenants in demanding a more compre-
hensive implementation of land reform in Region 1 than in Region 2. 
While the leasehold titles granted in Operation Leasehold areas in Region 2 can be 
"legally" transferred and therefore can be sold, land pawning is the only feasible way to 
transfer cultivation rights in the Operation Land Transfer areas of Region 1 4• Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, pawning contracts are more common in Region 1 than 2 (Table 2). 
Furthermore, the majority of pawned land in Region 1 is under CLT or leasehold tenure 
status, whereas in Region 2 pawning does not seem to be limited to land reform beneficia-
ries 5• 
An examination of mean loan sizes per hectare, controlling for tenurial status, 
revealed no significant patterns, except in Vl where the returns to rice farming are higher 
due to uniform land quality, and higher yields and cropping intensity. The differential 
access to informal credit appears to be based more on the supply of cultivation rights and 
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quality of land than on tenurial status and related lending risk. This finding suggests a low 
risk of eviction if these illegal transactions are reported in an Operation Land Transfer area. 
There appear to be limited incentives for reporting these illegal transactions. If land 
received in an Operation Land Transfer area is pawned and the pawning is reported to the 
Department of Agrarian Reform, the land will revert to the farmers' organization 
(Samahang Nayon) which allots it to another eligible former tenant on that parcel. But the 
majority of the pawning transactions were implemented with a written contract between 
friends and relatives so that long term relationships and known reputations established an 
information base and lowered the reporting risk. 
The average loan size obtained with land pawning is significantly larger than other 
short term informal loans reported in Region 1 without land pawning (8640 Pesos in Vl and 
2323 Pesos in V2) 6• Furthermore, the imputed mean annual interest rate of pawning 
contracts usually ranged from 17 to 37 percent, while short-term informal loans typically 
carry a higher explicit interest rate of 50 to 60 percent per annum 7• 
Conceptual Model 
Recent evidence suggests that short-term informal credit contracts (typically covering 
one crop season) with an explicit interest rate and without land collateral are generally 
available for financing production or consumption expenses (Esguerra and Meyer; Floro). 
But to obtain larger and longer-term loans, collateral is typically required in both the formal 
and informal credit markets. Table 2 indicates that the majority of the pawning contracts 
were undertaken to finance productive purposes -- education, overseas travel, start a new 
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nonfarm business -- where the expected rate of return to the investment is considered higher 
than farming 8• Hence, we can hypothesize that a liquidity constrained profit maximizing 
pawner will choose to pawn out land based on (i) expected rate of return to rice farming 
relative to alternative investments, and (ii) the implicit interest rate of the pawning contract 
relative to other sources of finance. 
The returns to rice farming per hectare will be lower on lower quality land, i.e., 
unirrigated land where only one crop of rice can be grown, poor quality soils, and mountain-
ous terrain 9• Farm households with smaller farm size, fewer inherited assets and less 
education would be expected to view investments in rice farming, which is relatively land 
and capital intensive, as less remunerative over the long term than investments in non-farm 
employment, which is dependent mainly on the quantity and quality of family labor supply. 
Indeed, investments in non-farm employment may be more profitable than rice farming 
overall, but wealthier households either self finance or have access to formal financial 
markets to finance their investments while poorer farmers have to rely on land pawning. 
Thus, households with poorer quality land, smaller farm size, less education and fewer assets 
will tend to pawn out land to invest directly in non-farm employment in the overseas or 
local market or indirectly by improving human capital through education. It is also expected 
that households with other sources of income (e.g. non-farm) will be less likely to pawn out 
land. Furthermore, pawning may be essential for a farm household rationed out of other 
forms of formal and informal loans, or already too far in debt to obtain new loans without 
pawnmg. 
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While pawners view rice farming as less profitable than other investments, pawnees 
who grant loans in exchange for temporary cultivation rights consider farming to be more 
profitable and hence forgo the return they would have earned by investing their funds 
elsewhere. This implies that profit maximizing liquidity and asset rich households accept 
pawned land when they have a comparative advantage in farming relative to other invest-
ment opportunities or when they lack good alternative investment opportunities. Thus, we 
would expect pawnees to have better quality land, larger farms, greater assets, and more 
education. 
The prevalence of multiple tenurial status and limited transferability of land rights 
adds another dimension to pawning contracts in rice growing areas. Since owner cultivators 
have transferable land rights and therefore have access to collateralized formal loans, we 
expect that they will engage in fewer pawning contracts than land reform beneficiaries. 
Since pawning contracts are illegal, pawnees risk eviction if discovered by reform officials 
and this increases transaction costs. These costs can be internalized ( ceteris paribus ), 
however, by varying loan size per hectare according to the degree of risk involved. Further-
more, the eviction risk can be reduced by making loans only to borrowers with good 
reputations who are likely to repay loans. This implies that loan size per hectare should be 
positively associated with "the tenurial status of the land pawned and the reputation of the 
participants, given land quality. 
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Econometric Analysis 
Regression models were used to examine the factors affecting the behavior of 
pawners and pawnees. First, a logit model was estimated to determine the probability of 
a household pawning out (in) land where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the 
household is a pawner (pawnee) during the reference period and 0 otherwise. Second, a 
tobit model was estimated to explain the observed loan size per hectare where the depen-
dent variable is the loan amount for pawners (pawnees) and zero otherwise. 
A common set of independent variables was specified in all equations referring to 
the year 1985 to avoid possible endogeneity problems. The independent variables include 
land quality as measured by annual net returns to land per hectare in rice farming 
(LQUALITY), and rice cropping intensity, an alternative measure of land productivity 
(RICEINT). Initial household asset endowments are represented by farm size in hectares 
(FSIZE), human capital denoted by years of schooling of the household head (EDUHH), 
market value of inherited nonland assets in Pesos (ASSETS), non farm income in Pesos 
(NONFARM), and ratio of number of dependents to total family members (DEPRATIO). 
The reputation of the household head was proxied by a stability index calculated as the ratio 
of years in the village to the age of the household head (REPUTATION). To examine the 
effect of tenurial status, the proportion of beneficiary land to total land operated by the 
household (CLTLH) and the proportion of non-beneficiary land to total land operated (OC) 
are included in the models. The region specific implementation of land reform is captured 
by the interaction variables (CLTLHxREGION, OCxREGION) and by a REGION dummy 
variable in which one represents Region 1. 
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The model estimates are presented in Table 3. Pawners and pawnees tend to have 
opposite characteristics as evidenced by the opposite signs of several independent variables. 
The logit estimates in column two for the pawning out regression confirm our hypothesis 
that farm households deriving lower returns to farming tend to pawn out land for invest-
ments in non farm employment. The coefficient LQUALITY is negative and significant 
while that of farm size (FSIZE), though not statistically significant, has the expected 
negative sign. The ownership of nonland (ASSETS) and human assets (EDUHH) is 
negatively associated with the probability of being a pawner. The results also show that the 
probability of being a pawner increases significantly for beneficiary households in Region 
1 where land reform was more comprehensively implemented than in Region 2. The loan 
size per hectare is similarly affected by the same variables, as indicated by the tobit 
estimates. It is interesting to note, however, that once the pawning contract is chosen, rice 
cropping intensity (RICEINT, rather than LQUALITY) and reputation (REPUTE) become 
significant explanatory variables of loan size per hectare. 
The pawnee functi?ns show the expected results that asset rich farm households tend 
to be pawnees and negotiate larger loan sizes as evidenced by the positive and significant 
coefficients for farm size (FSIZE), inherited assets (ASSETS), and education of household 
head (EDUHH). While the coefficients of land quality (LQUALITY), also an indicator of 
wealth, are positive but not significant in both logit and tobit estimates, the rice cropping 
intensity (RICEINT) positively and significantly explains the loan size negotiated by the 
pawnees. The positive coefficient of farm size may not only indicate a wealth effect but also 
efficiency gains derived from specialization in rice farming. The fact that nonfarm income 
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(NONF ARM) has a significantly negative coefficient in both the logit and tobit regressions 
indicates that farm households who pawn in land tend to be specialized in farming. With 
larger farms and better land quality, pawnees tend to allocate relatively more time to 
farming than to non-farm enterprises. Negative but insignificant tenurial status variables 
(CL TI.JI; OC) explain pawnee behavior as one driven by the demand for cultivable land 
and a supply of liquid funds to generate a higher rate of return in farming. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Land pawning contracts have increasingly been observed in Philippine rice growing 
villages. Our analysis showed that farm households generally pawn out land to finance 
investments for non-farm employment either directly through financing overseas employment 
or non-farm business or indirectly by investing in education to increase returns to non-farm 
employment. Farm households who pawn out land are those with poorer quality land, 
smaller farm sizes, fewer inherited assets, and lower educational attainments. Pawnees, on 
the other hand, are wealthier households with larger farm sizes, greater inherited assets, and 
higher levels of education who derive a higher return from land investments possibly due 
to economies of scale and lower cost of capital. 
Since most pawners are land reform beneficiaries, fears have been expressed that 
pawning transactions will lead to an unequal distribution of land ownership, negating the 
spirit of the land reform. The fact that pawning contracts exist, however, indicates that the 
accumulation of land/ cultivation rights by a few households cannot be prevented through 
prohibition of land transfers, but rather by raising the profitability of agricultural invest-
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ments, particularly for small scale farming. Furthermore, beneficiaries were granted 
productive assets through land reform. Now they need to be given the flexibility to use 
these assets to pursue household goals and earn the highest possible rate of return on them. 
For some, this will imply a dedication to rice farming. For others, it will imply transforming 
their cultivation rights into other assets for which they expect a higher return. An appropri-
ate policy would be to either deregulate the restriction on the transfer of beneficiary land 
rights so that this land can be used as collateral for institutional loans, or to assist the formal 
financial institutions to effectively resolve the problems which present them from taking 




1. In 'sangland bili' arrangements, the pawner usually remained in actual possession of the 
land, but in the role of a share tenant to the creditor until the loans are repaid. Nonrepay-
ment of loans within the contracted period resulted in sale of land which then acquired a 
'fee simple' status (for further details refer McLennen). However, in recent pawning 
contracts, the cultivation rights are temporarily transferred to the lender in exchange for a 
loan and redeemed upon loan repayment. 
2. The land reform restricted transfer of land rights by the beneficiaries to only their legal 
heirs. This suppressed the supply in the land market. On the one hand, higher residual 
gains accruing to farm operators due to new rice technology and fixed land rentals increased 
the prospects of higher farm income and hence the demand for cultivable land. The 
increased demand for investment funds could not be met by formal financial institutions 
because the restriction on transfer of beneficiary land titles limited the use of land as loan 
collateral. The pawning of land cultivation rights emerged as a response to these institution-
al changes. 
3. Since a pawning transaction is a major decision for the household and involves a large 
volume of money, the quality of retrospective data is high. 
4. While Certificates of Land Transfer are not transferable outside the immediate family, 
the leasehold title can be legally transferred upon the consent of the landlord, provided 
payment for the tenancy title is not involved. 
5. A few cases were found where the creditor insisted on pawning rather than outright sale 
of ownership rights from owner cultivators to avoid problems with land retention limits 
prescribed by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Also a strong cultural orientation 
towards land ownership and cumbersome procedures and high transaction costs in the 
formal institutions may have induced some owner cultivators to prefer pawning. 
6. Data on all credit market transactions of the sample households in Region 1 were 
collected for three consecutive seasons beginning June 1988. The loans reported were 
deflated by the 1985 consumer price index. 
7. The implicit interest rate was computed as a percentage of mean net residual per hectare 
per annum earned from rice farming to mean loan size per hectare per annum. The 
negative implicit interest rate in RF3 was due to unusually low yields in 1985 due to crop 
damage. · 
8. Although a rigorous analysis could not be carried out to compare the rate of return on 
alternative investments with that in farming, a low rate of foreclosed contracts -- 6 percent 
of the contracts during the reference period in Region 1 and 14 percent in Region 2 --
support the argument. 
13 
9. The introduction of modern rice varieties which are more suited to irrigated and 
favorable rainfed conditions has widened the profitability of rice farming between favorable 
and unfavorable production environments (David and Otsuka). 
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Table 1 : Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Sample Households, 1985 
Item Region 1 Region 2 
Vl V2 V3 V4 vs 
No. of Sample HH 85 52 37 65 47 
Percent Area Irrigated 100 16 100 0 0 
Percent MV Adoption 100 100 100 79 59 
Rice Cropping Intensity 200 114 243 131 125 
Farm Size (ha.) 2.1 1.7 1.1 1.4 0.9 
Yield (ton/ha.) 4.7 3.4 3.6 2.9 1.9 
Tenurial status of sampl~ farms (P~r~~nt Qf ar~a 
operated) 
Beneficiaries a 85 81 37 27 17 
Non-Beneficiaries b 13 18 28 50 39 
Share Tenants 2 1 35 23 44 
a Refers to Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) and Lease Hold (LH). 
b Refers to Owner Cultivators (OC). 
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Table 2 : Profile of the Pawning Contracts, 1985-89 8 • 
Item 
No. of Pawning HH 
No. Pawning Contracts 
Percent of Pawned Land Under 
Beneficiary Status b 
Percent of Pawned Land Under 
Non-Beneficiary Status c 
Loan Size in '000 P /ha. /Contract d 
All Tenure Classes 
Beneficiaries 
Non-Beneficiaries 
Implicit Interest Rate 






























Purpose for Pawning Out ('000 P /ha./ Contract with percent given in parentheses) 
Productive Purposes 19.5 5.1 12.6 17.4 4.7 
(54) (70) (100) (67) (42) 








a Pawned-out and Pawned-in contracts are aggregated from 1985 to 1989. 
b Refers to Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) and Lease Hold (LH). 
c Refers to Owner Cultivators (QC). 
d Loan size is deflated by consumer price index (base = 1985). 
3.9 
(58) 
e Estimated as the percentage ratio of net residual from rice per year per hectare to loan 
size per hectare. The net residual is the total value of output minus cost of current inputs, 
fixed capital, labor and land rental payments. 
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Table 3: Regression Results of Determinants of Pawn Out/In Decisions (Logit Analysis) 
and Corresponding Loan Size Per Hectare (Tobit Analysis) 
Pawner Pawnee 
Lo git Tobit Logit Tobit 
INTERCEPT -1.86 ** -1.16 ** -2.69 ** -1.39 * 
LQUALITY -0.17 ** -0.74 0.71 0.24 
RICEINT 0.14 0.84 * 0.12 0.36 * 
FSIZE -0.18 -0.25 0.14 * 0.32 * 
EDUHH -0.12 * -0.78 ** 0.16 ** 0.77 ** 
ASSETS -0.11 ** -0.51 ** 0.49 ** 0.27 ** 
NONFARM -0.25 0.37 -0.13 * -0.05 * 
DEPRATIO -0.17 0.54 -0.53 -0.14 
REPUTATION 0.53 0.29 * 0.75 * 0.26 * 
CLTLH -0.69 -0.33 -0.13 -0.40 
oc '0.97 0.54 -0.45 -0.39 
CLTLHxREGION 2.16 * 1.21 ** 0.92 0.37 
OCxREGION 0.27 0.31 0.22 0.27 
REGION 0.67 0.52 0.52 0.37 
Log-likelihood -262.51 -578.90 -230.65 -525.65 
Chi-square 105.24 59.17 
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